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Utah Statutes 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4) & (4)(g) 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court. 
Utah Case Authority 
Grass Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
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ARGUMENT 
1. There is no issue of trial de novo. 
The Appellee goes on at length regarding there being no right to a de novo hearing. This 
entire argument is a red herring apparently designed to confuse the Court. Appellant's 
Motion for Review states: "This Motion is based on the fact that the evidence before the 
Administrative Law Judge does not support the Findings, and that at least one of the 
findings is clearly erroneous." The plain language of the Motion for Review (Addendum, 
Document No. 9) indicates that the evidence does not support the "findings" (plural), 
then proceeds to address in detail one of those. Giving a detailed rebuttal of one fact does 
not excuse the Labor Commission from considering the adequacy of evidence to support 
all of the findings. Such consideration is not a de novo hearing. 
2. Appellee is attempting to require Appellant to prove a negative, when the 
Appellant's assignment or error is entirely consistent with the applicable statute. 
When Appellee asserts that Appellant has failed to "marshal the facts,55 this is nothing 
more than a bid to require her to prove a negative. The essence of the Appellant's claim 
that the evidence does not support the findings is that there is a lack of substantial 
evidence. This Court's review is conducted pursuant to U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(g), which 
states that: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
Jensen v. Fountain Green, No. 20030597-CA 
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prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court. 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4) & (4)(g) 
Thus, the Appellant's assignment of error is not only proper, but tracks exactly the statute 
dealing with relief from the actions of an administrative agency. That this statute has real 
meaning is evident from Grass Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). "This 'substantial evidence test5 grants appellate courts greater latitude in 
reviewing the record than was previously granted under the Utah Employment Security 
Act's 'any evidence of substance' test." Id. at pg. 67. 
3. Although Appellee is correct in stating that the statute keeps the unemployment 
decision from being binding, it may, and should have been, considered by the Labor 
Commission and the Administrative Law Judge. 
The citation by Appellee indicates what Appellant had missed, that the decision in the 
unemployment case is not binding. However, it is a part of the Agency Record, and is 
certainly highly relevant on the issue of whether there was a discharge for cause. At a 
minimum, it should have been considered by the ALJ in rendering her decision, though 
she could, admittedly, have chosen to find to the contrary. However, the record is devoid 
of any indication that the ALJ so much as looked at the reasoned determination of a 
coordinate agency. There is special significance in this because that decision was made 
on an appeal which reversed the original determination. Common sense indicates that 
Jensen v. Fountain Green, No 20030597-CA Page 4 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
when another agency reversed a initial determination to make a ruling in favor of 
Appellant, that determination should be carefully considered before a contrary 
determination is made. That was not done in this case. This suggests strongly that the 
Administrative Law Judge simply rubber stamped the city's decision without considering 
all of the evidence in the record. 
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to consider the inconsistency of Fountain 
Green City's actions in this matter, first denying that they had terminated Appellant at all, 
then changing their position to a claim that she was not a full-time employee, then 
claiming that she was fired for just cause. 
CONCLUSION 
The "whole record before the Court" indicates that the City of Fountain Green has 
repeatedly changed their position to try to find something to excuse their actions. Even 
the Administrative Law Judge found & prima facie case. The supposedly non-
discriminatory reason for the firing is not supported by "substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." This is evident from the Labor 
Commission's reversal on the full-time employee issue, the failure to so much as consider 
an appeal decision in favor of Appellant on the termination for cause issue, and the city's 
constantly changing legal positions throughout this action. Judgment should be entered in 
her favor, with a subsequent hearing on damages. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2004 
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ARGUMENT 
Throughout thenr Appellant's Brief, Defendants once 
aga in aft r — f • •- ^-fine t-!»-, " v-t o+ trespass" as f he 
instaliaL^'u wi i_.tiv, i,\ i.ii;,n:j in ti;-*_ J. ;/0s. , i.s were 
i ndeed the uar-t- nf trespass" of which Foxtail comp] ai ns , 
D e f e n d a n t s ..--.. .. .,. : • - <• • -o 1:1. a i 1 1 11 1 ei 1: asse 1: t :i o 1 1 11: 1 a 1: Foxta:i 1 
could not. maintain a cause of action for trespass both 
possession of 1. he Land" at that i.imr-, \n<\ t :cause Foxtail 's 
However, Foxtail has repeatedly explained that its cause of 
action ; ir. rot b a s e * • • » • vi,t- i l l a t i o n oi the 1 it : ] ^ I L J , 
but on Defendants' tdiime to remove the uti^Lies, and 
( i i ) Defendants' continued use of t:he ntil.it-.ies. Moreover, 
r ( . x 1 . i i i i. 1 : <•jxj_) I a i 11 < M 1 \ -hp^^s" 
are actionable under both Utah csise law and under the common 
] a/"ii \ :: f trespass as 1: ef I ecte :i :i 1 :i tl 1 B R astatemei it (Second) of 
Torts, and why these "acts of trespass" are not barred by 
the statute of ] i mitations. Similar !^  Defendant'~ havr-
failed to convincingly argue that thiL Court shouia dispense 
w i t b th^ usual rule r ^ ^ h - j n q absol nte 1 ini t • <^ f title to 
estai-iuL an easement ,. .. - . ^ 1 J. . F:i r.: . : y
 f because 
Foxtail has not had an opportunity 10 present evidence 
relevai. *qi iest f :: 3 : a 1 1 J s 
Court should not affirm the District Court's judgment on the 
alternative ground that is not entitled to such relief. 
POINT I. FOXTAIL HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR TRESPASS. 
Defendants contend that their refusal to re^move the 
utilities cannot constitute a trespass because (i) the 
installation of the utilities in the 1970s was not 
"wrongful, " (ii) Defendants do not have a duty to remove the 
utilities, and (iii) Defendants' continued use of the 
utilities does not, "for all practical purposes'' cause water 
to flow through Foxtail's property. However, it is 
primarily Defendants' failure to properly identify the "act 
of trespass," not a correct legal analysis, that leads 
Defendants to this conclusion. 
The "acts of trespass" of which Foxtail complains are 
(i) Defendants' failure to remove the utilities, and (ii) 
Defendants' continued use of the utilities. Foxtail has not 
complained that the installation of the utilities in the 
1970s was wrongful and has not sought redress on that basis. 
Therefore, Defendants' contention that Foxtail cannot 
maintain its cause of action based on the installation of 
the utilities, while true, is nothing more than a diversion 
and does not help this Court in its analysis. 
Similarly, Defendants' argue that their refusal to 
remove the utilities is not a trespass because they are 
under no "duty" to do so. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 158 (1965) (Trespass occurs when one "fails to remove from 
2 
the 1 and ~< thing which he \r under a H '^ "^ remove. 
making this argument, Defendants' agaiii ±^ok to th^ origin «i 
installation of Hi^ Tit--M -it ifj; an th,j • • ]T J- isib^- basis 101 
su^:. . i.. : .* ... , .; y coi, , : .., ..use .. : h^ 
ut i 1 i t ies were wronaf ul ^f. v placed upon Foxra 1 1 ' s nropertv. " 
that the installation of 4> n< -, ilitii-r wa. '<ot wrongful, 
Defend-c * *-
the installation, but as a i<-r:uif or thei : * aiian* ui remove 
the utilities after Foxtail revoked, the consent -*:i ] / 
Foxtail's predecessors in interest *-^  maintain in. ULIJ ,t-^r-
in t b^i r riresent lo^at J ^ n . 
JocU'.;. e. > .-statement: vb\j_or , : _uts provides: 
( ('• Failure to Remove Thing Placed on Land 
Pursu int t .. ]j i cense oi Other Pi. iv i leqe 
A trespass may he o j>mmi t t «MJ i>\ \A\* t'.rj* mued 
presence on the land oi a structuie, chattel, or 
other thing which the actor or his predecessoi i n 
legal i nterest has r l a r ^ ^^ + ,w" j ^  ' 
(a.) with the consent of tne person then ' :i 
possession of the land, if the actor fails to 
remove it after the consent ban be1 en effort ivrjlv 
terminated, 
K e s i a t einei i t ( S e c o n d ) o f Tor t:s § II 60 (1965) As e x p l a i n e d i n 
A p p e l l a n t ' r ; R r i e f . ur \ 9 - 21 D e f e n d a n t s had p e r m i s s i o n t o 
i n s t a 1 .i .,..<_ •. i - .. : < : i i l 11: I e i i: p r e s e n t 1 o c a t i o n a t 
least until the yeai 20()o When th-e onsent was revoked, a 
utilities. 
3 
Defendants also ignore the fact that their continued 
use of the utilities gives rise to a duty to remove them. 
Foxtail has offered to remove the utilities at its own 
expense if Defendants would stop using the utilities. In 
the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Foxtail's counsel stated: 
Foxtail would be happy to remove the pipes and the 
manhole cover at its own expense, as long as the 
defendant was ordered to stop using that, because 
we can't do it -- Foxtail can't do that, it's 
public policy reasons, unless they stop using it 
first. 
R. 211 (p. 41). However, Defendants continue to use the 
utilities and refuse to allow Foxtail to remove them, even 
at its own expense. Unless Defendants are willing to 
abandon the utilities entirely and allow Foxtail to remove 
the utilities itself, they have a duty to remove them. They 
cannot have it both ways. 
Defendants cite U.P.C., Inc. v. R.Q.A. Gen'l, Inc., 990 
P.2d 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) in support of their position 
that Foxtail cannot maintain an action for trespass because 
Defendants have no duty to remove the utilities. That case, 
however, is distinguishable. In U.P.C., the defendant 
refused to remove a billboard sign foundation from the 
plaintiff's land upon the expiration of the defendant's 
lease. The lease was silent as to who, if anyone, had the 
obligation to remove the foundation. The Court held that in 
such a case, where the respective duties of contracting 
4 
parties are reflected in a written agreement, the Cour t 
would not . .• it.-jdo the contract, itself to impose an 
additional duty on - ^ ^ *^  f h ^ parties. The Court stated, 
* court may not m.^w <* setter contract for the parties 
than they have made for tboniRplvpt .^ «t _*1 ' -7110+- M V I 
Tea r.. DL- A,, A /^ i^ cjctj. , 11 J< v. 1 dines Corp. . 1 ,, 
970 (Utah n . App . 1^88 :. the instant -'ase. WL- have _io 
installation, use, or removal or. tii-- t. ilities. Because 
U_. P. * •• d case 01 contract ' •- n'^-H . 
contract . ^  t "H ~ .^ ^  « ^  U. P . C . ' s ho i. < i 11 J ^  is no t. app i i cab 1 e 
Finally Defendants argue that th^ir "•ntinued use of 
:. : • •_.„>. does not constitute: ;n^L,^ entry'' ^^ 
water onto or beneath the surface of Foxtai.:':'. property 
r f •• i i . - 1 . " i 
<i permanent- column • 1 w.«i<-: v, IJ •!; ,as been present since 
the ea: : 1 y ] 970s " Appe 1 ] e« *' 3 B1 : :i ef at II :! T1: 1 :ii 3 <= L::I : g 1 lme 111 
ignores the simple and undisputed facts that Defendants have 
continue] 1,; »v-^^ «;bo utilities since thev were, installed and 
that; Lih.... ;•—<_., . w.
 t,ipes today is not :i,<- same water K:, :-
was i .11 the. pipes th i rt-y years aqo . it cannot reasonable/ be 
dispi ited -. • > .:-jt,_ii. .omtirnie to use L..UO 
utilities, water continues? t 1 I w through them, entering 
Defendants are also incorrect when they state that 
5 
their continued use of the utilities does "not cause Foxtail 
any deprivation of its property that is separate and 
distinct from the mere presence of the utilities 
themselves." Id. As explained above, the only reason that 
Foxtail cannot remove the utilities itself is because 
Defendants continue to use them. See supra p. 4. Moreover, 
as long as water is flowing through the utilities on 
Foxtail's property, Foxtail risks a leak resulting in damage 
to Foxtail's building or erosion of its soil. These risks 
would be eliminated if Defendants stopped using the 
utilities. 
POINT II. FOXTAIL'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Once again, Defendants argue that the installation of 
the utilities, if a trespass at all, must be characterized 
as a permanent trespass which accrued for statute-of-
limitation purposes at the time the utilities were installed 
in the 1970s. Once again, Defendants are correct in their 
characterization of this uact of trespass" as a permanent 
trespass and in their conclusion that any claim based only 
on this "act of trespass" would be barred by the statute of 
limitations. Once again, however, Defendants ignore the two 
"acts of trespass" identified by Foxtail as the bases for 
its cause of action: i) Defendants' failure to remove the 
utilities; and (ii) Defendants' continued use of the 
utilities - both of which should be characterized as 
6 
continuing f~ respasses. 
Defendants argue first that the installation of the 
uHlitief-' :° analo-yi1/' to th^ dump";-H of debris in Breiggar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. , ^2 P. ? d 11 *• ' 
(Utah 200^: . ,-,1-d M u ! h^ransp the dumping of debris was 
. i i i . d ' j L . ^ i . ••<.,
 i i-:!*:i • respass, so should :ie 
installation oi th«* utilitif-n However, the dumping oi 
installation of the utilities is not t } i * - '\a <t of trespass" 
ii 1 this case. When I '! • f f ' r* •»>. 
identified as either Defendants' failuje to remove the 
utilites or as Defendants' continued us^ ^f the utilities it 
becomes clear that t :he trespass is cent-
 L,i,i.iq in nature. 
The Court in Breiggar recognized that- < oonti inrrno 
tr espas.. . , • > *--.'pasL 
[giving iiae tci multiple causer; of action. Jd * > l 
in 
v
 :»:J vtiiy moment i rial Defendants t a n i [ t--iove ti.^ -ii 
utilities] ^i^r*- - << <• - new cause of. action." Simiicii 
a^ Innq as Detendants' continue to iise the utilities, *? T~••• 
cause of action accrues every time Defendants use their 
water 
Defendants cite two ( 'alifornia cases and OTIP 
Pennsy I van i. i ^j ,! ' • : ] -'•-' • a n 
encroachment effecting a permanent change ii i the condition 
7 
of the land is a permanent trespass. See Appellee's Brief 
at 18-20 (citing Castelletto v. Bendon, 13 Cal. Rptr. 907 
(Cal. App. 1961); Bertram v. Orlando, 227 P.2d 894 (Cal. 
App. 1951); Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 197 
A.2d 44 (Penn. 1964)). While those cases may reflect the 
law in those jurisdictions, they certainly do not reflect 
the law in Utah or the position taken by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. In Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 
34 8 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that, 
*[a] cause of action based upon encroachment is of the 
nature of either a continuing trespass or a nuisance/' 
Moreover, a comment to Section 160 of the Restatement, 
specifically states: 
e. Continuing trespass. The intentional 
violation of such a duty of removal [arising out 
of the revocation of consent] constitutes a 
continuing trespass for the entire time during 
which the actor is under a duty to remove the 
thing, and gives to the possessor of the land a 
series of independent causes of action for 
trespass. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160 cmt. e (1965). See 
also, 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners § 51 (2003) ("The 
maintenance of an encroachment on the land may be a 
continuing trespass, a nuisance, or both."). Therefore, 
despite Defendants' argument to the contrary, the clear 
weight of authority and the position taken by the Utah 
Supreme Court is that an encroachment such as the presence 
8 
of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property constitutes a 
continuing tort. 
Finally, Defendants argue that Hoary v. U.S., 64 P.3d 
214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) stands for the proposition that 
the concept of continuing trespass does not apply whenever 
the invasion of property rights is socially beneficial. 
This is not what Hoary says. The Court in Hoary first 
explains the concepts of continuing trespass and continuing 
nuisance and cites numerous cases indicating that they 
remain viable concepts in Colorado. See id. at 218-19 
(citing Steiger v. Burroughs, 878 P.2d 131, 136 (Colo. App. 
1994) (defendant's house remaining on plaintiff's property 
constituted continuing trespass); Cobai v. Young, 679 P.2d 
121, 123-24 (Colo. App. 1984) (snow sliding from defendant's 
roof to plaintiff's house constituted continuing trespass); 
Docheff v. City of Broomfield, 623 P.2d 69, 71 (Colo. App. 
1980) (defendant's storm drainage system flooding 
plaintiff's adjacent property constituted continuing 
trespass). The Court then goes on to recognize an exception 
to the concept of continuing trespass which had been 
established by Colorado courts in the early part of last 
century. This exception specifically applies to irrigation 
ditches and railway lines because they "'represented a class 
of enterprises Aso vital to the future development of our 
state.'" Ixl. at 219 (quoting Middelkamp v. Bessemer 
9 
Irrigating Ditch Co,, 103 P. 280, 284 (Colo. 1909)). 
Ultimately, the Court in Hoary declined the Defendants' 
invitation to extend this exception to the trespass at issue 
in that case. Hoary at 221-22. In short, Hoary does not 
does not support the Defendants' contention that any 
socially beneficial property invasion must be characterized 
as a permanent trespass. Rather, Hoary stands for the 
proposition that u[f]or continuing intrusions - either by 
way of trespass or nuisance - each repetition or continuance 
amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of 
action" unless the intrusion is an irrigation ditch or a 
railway line. Id., at 218-220. 
POINT III. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE AN EASEMENT BY 
IMPLICATION. 
Defendants acknowledge the usual rule that an easement 
by implication requires absolute unity of title. However, 
they ask this Court to carve out an exception to this rule 
under the facts of this case. See Appellee's Brief at 21. 
In short, Defendants argue that because Foxtail was aware of 
the location and use of the utilities at the time it 
purchased the property, the element requiring absolute unity 
of title should be eased to require only partial unity in 
this case. However, Defendants do not cite any case in 
which any court from any jurisdiction has ever carved out 
the exception they seek. Instead, they point to some 
general language in Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. 
10 
App. 1989) in support of their argument and then they 
misapply that language to the facts of this case. Moreover, 
Defendants utterly fail to address the rationale behind the 
unity of title requirement and fail to explain why that 
rationale should be set aside here. 
I n
 Butler, this Court explained that an easement by 
implication arises xxxas an inference of the intention of the 
parties to a conveyance,'" rather than out of the express 
language of the conveyance. Icl. at 1153 (quoting Adamson v. 
Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 270 (1947). The Court spelled out 
the specific elements of such an easement and held that when 
these elements are present, it is presumed that "the parties 
contracted with a view to the condition of the property as 
it actually was at the time of the transaction." _Id. at 
1152-53. 
Defendants rely upon this language in arguing that 
because Foxtail knew about the utilities at the time it 
purchased its property, only partial unity of title should 
be required. However, Defendants' reliance upon this 
language is misplaced and its argument is illogical. First, 
the "transaction" referred to in Butler is the transaction 
in which the unity of title was severed - not the 
transaction in which the present owner purchased its 
property. Second, there is no logical connection between 
Foxtail's purchase and the creation of an easement by 
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implication. An easement by implication is created at the 
time unity of title is severed. A subsequent transaction 
cannot cause an easement by implication to be created or 
defeated. Defendants' argument is simply illogical. 
Moreover, Defendants have not countered Foxtail's 
argument in its Appellant's Brief at 29-31 that the absolute 
unity of title requirement is supported by a strong policy 
rationale. This policy was summarized in Farley v. Howard, 
70 N.Y.S. 51, aff'd 65 NE 1116 (App. Div. 1901) as follows: 
[The] rule [requiring absolute unity of title] 
necessarily involves the proposition that the man 
creating the easement is the absolute owner of 
both lots, and has, therefore, the right to put 
upon either any incumbrance he likes. Quite 
clearly the rule fails in this case. Howard was 
the absolute owner of 32 only. As to 34 he owned 
but a one-half interest. While he could do what 
he pleased with his undivided one-half interest in 
that lot, he could not impose upon Dumond's one-
half interest any burden whatever. 
Id. at 53. Similarly, the common owners of the Victoria 
Canyon and Elizabeth House properties at the time of 
development collectively owned only a one-half interest in 
the Elizabeth House property. The other one-half interest 
was owned by Elizabeth Drinkhaus, who had no ownership 
interest at all in the Victoria Canyon property. R. 120, 
197. Absent an explicit agreement to the contrary (of which 
there is no evidence in the record), those common owners 
could not impose any burden whatsoever on Drinkhaus' 
interest in the Elizabeth House. 
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In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate why this 
Court should deviate from its rule that an easement will not 
be upheld unless "the clear weight of the evidence supports 
each of the elements necessary to constitute an easement by 
implication." Butler at 1152. 
POINT IV. DEFENDANTS7 ARGUMENT THAT FOXTAIL IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS PREMATURE AND 
THEIR CLAIM THAT FOXTAIL IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES IS INCORRECT. 
Defendants contend that the District Court's judgment 
should be affirmed because Foxtail is not entitled to the 
injunctive relief it requested in its Complaint. See 
Appellee's Brief at 26-29. However, because Foxtail has not 
had an opportunity to present evidence in support of its 
prayer for injunctive relief nor has the District Court had 
an opportunity to evaluate such evidence, Defendants' 
argument is premature. 
Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to 
grant injunctive relief or award damages to an aggrieved 
party. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) . Utah courts follow a ''balance of injury" test to 
determine which remedy to award. Id. 
Under that test, an equity court may exercise its 
discretion not to grant injunctive relief when the 
plaintiff is not irreparably harmed by the 
violation, the violation was innocent, defendants7 
cost of removal would be disproportionate and 
oppressive compared to the benefits plaintiffs 
would derive from it, and plaintiffs can be 
compensated by damages. 
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Id. at 170-71 (quoting Crimmons v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 
480 (Utah 1981) . In order to properly apply this test, 
trial courts must consider evidence presented by the parties 
relevant to the factors set forth in the test. See id. at 
171; See also Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Utah 
Ct• App. 198 7) . "Where a court's ruling on a motion for an 
injunction is based on its consideration of the evidence 
presented in light of relevant legal factors, the grant or 
denial of injunctive relief rests within the discretion of 
the trial court." Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 
1999) . 
In the instant case, Foxtail has not had an opportunity 
to present any evidence in support of its request for an 
injunction. Before a court can rule on the issuance of an 
injunction, Foxtail must have an opportunity to present 
evidence of the harm it will suffer if the Defendants are 
allowed to continue to use the utilities in their present 
location. Specifically, Foxtail would want to present 
evidence of (i) the risk of damage to Foxtail's building or 
land caused by a potential water leak; (ii) the impact the 
utilities have on the rental value of Foxtail's apartments 
(an unsightly manhole cover now sits in the middle of 
Foxtail's lawn); and (iii) the impact the utilities have on 
the resale value of Foxtail's property. Moreover, 
Defendants must present evidence of the harm and 
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inconvenience they would suffer if required to move the 
utilities. None of this evidence was presented to the 
District Court and the District Court never made any 
decision with respect to Foxtail's request for an 
injunction. 
If this Court does evaluate Foxtail's request for an 
injunction, even in the absence of the necessary evidence in 
the record, Foxtail believes it would be entitled to an 
injunction under the rationale of Hatanaka, 738 P.2d 1052. 
In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against his 
neighbor seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the 
neighbor to remove a fence, dirt, and debris the neighbor 
had placed on the plaintiff's property but in an area where 
the location of the property line was in dispute. After a 
thorough consideration of the evidence presented, the trial 
court delineated the boundary and concluded that the 
neighbor was "trespassing on plaintiff's property when [he] 
constructed the fence and deposited the dirt and debris." 
Id. at 1054. The trial court went on to grant the 
injunction ordering the neighbor to remove the fence, dirt, 
and debris, and also permanently enjoining the neighbor from 
doing similar future acts on the plaintiff's property. Id. 
On appeal, this Court upheld the injunction, even though it 
specifically noted that the neighbor's conduct was not 
willful or malicious. Id. In other words, even an innocent 
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trespasser (such as Defendants in the instant case) can be 
subjected to the burden of injunctive relief, as Foxtail has 
requested. 
Finally, Defendants contend that Foxtail would not be 
entitled to compensatory daimages caused by the alleged 
trespass. First, Defendants fail to recognize that the 
District Court could award damages even though Foxtail did 
not specifically request an award of damages in its 
Complaint. Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
Second, Defendants are not correct when they state that 
there is "no basis for an award of money damages." 
Appellee's Brief at 26. One measure of damages for trespass 
is the diminution in value of the property caused by the 
encroachment. Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) . Of course, Foxtail would have 
to present evidence, such as the expert testimony of an 
commercial property appraiser, to support its claim that its 
property is worth less with the utilities and manhole cover 
than it would be if they were removed. However, Foxtail has 
not had an opportunity to present such evidence yet. 
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Another possible measure of damages is the loss of rental 
value of Foxtail's apartments caused by the presence of the 
utilities on Foxtail's property. Although this type of loss 
might be difficult to measure, Foxtail should be given an 
opportunity to present the necessary evidence.1 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the District Court's 
decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for further consideration of Foxtail's claim consistent with 
the positions set forth in Foxtail's briefs, 
SUBMITTED this April 22, 2004. 
DavM S. Kotqler 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1
 As an aside, the difficulty in ascertaining damages 
provides an additional reason for the trial court to issue 
the requested injunction. See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. 
v. Spanish Fork, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (Utah 1996) (injunction 
is appropriate where *[m]onetary damages would be difficult 
and perhaps impossible to ascertain, and [the business] 
would be forced to bring continuing and successive lawsuits 
for damages."); see also Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 70 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("Loss of business and goodwill may 
constitute irreparable harm susceptible to injunction."). 
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